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A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE RECORDS 
OF THE STATE RATIFYING 
CONVENTIONS AS A SOURCE OF THE 
ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 
Gregory E. Maggs* 
On September 17, 1787, the delegates to the Federal Constitu-
tional Convention finished drafting the Constitution.  Yet the Consti-
tution could not go into effect until it was ratified in the states, as spe-
cified in Article VII.  Starting in the fall of 1787, legislatures in the 
original thirteen states called for conventions for the purpose of de-
ciding whether to ratify the Constitution.  Many of the records of 
these state ratifying conventions have survived.  The records reveal 
some of what the delegates at the state conventions said during their 
debates and discussions about the proposed Constitution.  According-
ly, writers often cite these records as evidence of the original meaning 
of the Constitution. 
Thousands of articles and hundreds of cases have cited the 
records of the state ratifying conventions to support claims about the 
original meaning of the Constitution.  This Article offers a concise 
guide to these records, providing the basic information that lawyers, 
judges, law clerks, and legal scholars ought to have before advancing, 
contesting, or evaluating claims about the original meaning of the 
Constitution based on the records of the state ratifying conventions.  
It explains theories of how the records might help to prove the origi-
nal intent of the Framers, the original understanding of the ratifiers, 
and the original objective meaning of the Constitution’s text.  The Ar-
ticle also considers eight possible grounds for impeaching assertions 
made about the original meaning, recommending that anyone making 
 
 *  Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, George Washington 
University Law School.  This is the second in a series of guides to important sources of the original 
meaning of the U.S. Constitution.  For my guide to the Federalist Papers, see Gregory E. Maggs, A 
Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Consti-
tution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801 (2007).  I would like to thank Professors Bradford Clark and Peter Smith 
for their comments and suggestions.  The George Washington University Law School has provided me 
with generous financial support. 
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or evaluating a claim about the original meaning take these eight ar-
guments into account and that anyone using these arguments to im-
peach claims about the original meaning consider the possible coun-
terarguments. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 17, 1787, after meeting all summer in Philadelphia, 
delegates to the Federal Constitutional Convention approved the Consti-
tution.1  Yet, although the drafting was completed, the Constitution 
could not go into effect until it was ratified in the states.  On this point, 
Article VII of the Constitution specified: “The Ratification of the Con-
ventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this 
Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”2 
Starting in the fall of 1787, legislatures in the original thirteen states 
called for conventions for the purpose of deciding whether to ratify the 
Constitution.  Many records of these state ratifying conventions have 
survived.  These records reveal some of what the delegates at the state 
conventions said during their debates and discussions about the proposed 
Constitution.  Accordingly, writers often cite these records as evidence of 
the original meaning of the Constitution.  A computer search shows that 
more than 160 Supreme Court cases and more than 1,750 law review ar-
ticles have relied on these records in interpreting the Constitution.3  In 
one decision, U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton,4 the majority and dissenting 
opinions cited passages from the records twenty times in deciding wheth-
er the Constitution permits states to limit the terms of members of Con-
gress. 
James Madison served as one of the chief architects of the Constitu-
tion at the federal convention, and he took the most extensive notes of 
those proceedings.5  But when interpreting the Constitution, Madison be-
lieved that the records of the state ratification convention provided the 
best evidence of the original meaning.  Madison said: 
[W]hatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men 
who formed our Constitution, the sense of that body could never be 
regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the Constitution.  As 
the instrument came from them it was nothing more than the draft 
of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were 
breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the 
several State Conventions.  If we were to look, therefore, for the 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 2. Id. 
 3. To find cases that cite the leading compilations of records from the state ratifying conven-
tions (described in Part III below), I searched Westlaw’s SCT, SCT-OLD, and JLR databases for “(el-
liot! /10 debate!) (documentary /5 ratification).” 
 4. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 5. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS, 1776–1787, at 243–45, 251–53, 
255, 270 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976). 
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meaning of the instrument beyond the face of the instrument, we 
must look for it, not in the General Convention, which proposed, 
but in the State Conventions, which accepted and ratified the Con-
stitution.6 
Yet despite frequent references to the records of the state ratifying 
conventions, and despite the widely accepted importance of these 
records,7 I suspect that many lawyers, judges, law clerks, and legal scho-
lars feel inadequately prepared to make or evaluate claims about the 
original meaning of the Constitution that rest on these records.  The sub-
ject of the state ratification debates is not generally taught in law schools, 
and a general overview of the subject is not easy to piece together from 
available sources.  For these reasons, many legal professionals could 
benefit from accessible information about the content of these records, 
about theories under which the records might provide evidence of the 
original meaning of the Constitution, and about possible grounds for im-
peaching claims based on these records. 
My goal is to address these needs in this short guide.  (I previously 
have prepared a similar guide to the Federalist Papers,8 and I borrow lib-
erally from its format here.)  I hope to provide the basic information that 
lawyers, judges, law clerks, and legal scholars ought to have before ad-
vancing, contesting, or evaluating claims about the original meaning of 
the Constitution based on the records of the state ratifying conventions.  
I have tried to keep the guide concise so that the intended audience will 
have time to read it.  At the same time, I hope that the guide is sufficient-
ly analytical to promote critical thinking. 
In Part II of this guide, I address the significant initial question of 
what the term “original meaning” embraces.  I show that legal writers use 
this generic term to cover three different kinds of historic meaning.  
These include the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution at 
the Federal Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, the original un-
derstanding of the delegates to the state ratifying conventions, and the 
original objective meaning of the Constitution’s text.  I do not take sides 
regarding which type of meaning is the most significant.  But understand-
ing the distinctions among these three types of meaning is important be-
cause the records of the state ratifying conventions do not provide equal 
evidence of each kind of meaning. 
In Part III, I describe the leading compilations of the records from 
the state ratifying conventions and several of the best secondary sources 
on the ratification process.  Recently, as I will describe, some of these 
works have been put on the Internet.  Their easy availability is likely to 
 
 6. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1796), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage? 
collId=llac&fileName=005/llac005.db&recNum=384. 
 7. See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original 
Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. REV. 801, 802, 821 (2007). 
 8. See id. at 801. 
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make references to ratification debates even more common in the future 
and is therefore likely to increase the need for jurists and other legal 
writers to understand them. 
In Part IV, I provide an overview of the ratification of the Constitu-
tion in the original thirteen states.  I describe how the states called the 
conventions, what the delegates debated, and what records were kept.  
As readers will see, some states engaged in lengthy debates and kept ex-
cellent records, while other states considered the question of ratification 
only briefly and kept almost no records. 
In Part V, I explain various theories for believing that the records of 
the state ratification debates might provide evidence of the original 
meaning of the Constitution (including the original intent of the Framers, 
the original understanding of the ratifiers, and the original objective 
meaning of the Constitution’s text).  To make the discussion concrete, I 
have included examples from various judicial opinions. 
In Part VI, I address eight potential arguments for impeaching 
claims about the original meaning based on the records of the state rati-
fying conventions.  These arguments are as follows: 
1. The records of the state ratifying conventions are incomplete. 
2. The records of the state ratifying conventions are not necessarily 
verbatim transcripts of the debates. 
3. The views of individual delegates may not represent the views of 
the ratifiers generally. 
4. Each of the ratifying conventions may have had a different un-
derstanding of the Constitution. 
5. Statements made during the ratification debates, in many in-
stances, were not what actually persuaded the ratifiers to support 
the Constitution. 
6. The records provide unreliable and otherwise suspect evidence 
of the intent of the Framers (as opposed to the ratifiers) of the 
Constitution. 
7. Comments at the state ratification debates are often taken out of 
context. 
8. The ratification debates by themselves cannot provide much 
guidance for interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
As I will show with examples, each of these eight arguments has 
some merit, but none is so powerful that it should prevent any reliance 
on the records of the state ratifying conventions.  Indeed, all are subject 
to counterarguments of varying strength.  Accordingly, I strongly rec-
ommend that anyone making or evaluating a claim about the original 
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meaning take these eight arguments into account, and that anyone using 
these arguments to impeach claims about the original meaning consider 
carefully the possible counterarguments. 
In Part VII, I state a brief conclusion. 
II. DEFINITIONS OF ORIGINAL MEANING9 
Before discussing the records of the state ratifying conventions 
themselves, an essential initial question must be addressed: what does the 
phrase “original meaning” of the Constitution embrace?  This question 
does not have a single answer.  On the contrary, judges and legal scholars 
attempting to discern the original meaning of the Constitution have rec-
ognized that at least three different kinds of original meaning may have 
existed.  Anyone writing about or reading the records of the ratifying 
conventions should recognize and think carefully about the distinctions 
among these meanings. 
One kind of original meaning, which I will call the “original intent,” 
is the meaning that the Framers of the Constitution—the delegates who 
drafted the document in 1787—intended the Constitution to have.  It is 
what the Supreme Court as early as 1838 called the “meaning and inten-
tion of the convention which framed and proposed [the Constitution] for 
adoption and ratification to the conventions of the people of and in the 
several states.”10  When historians attempt to discern the original intent, 
they seek to discover what the delegates at the Constitutional Conven-
tion actually thought the Constitution meant, not what reasonable per-
sons should have thought or what the ratifiers of the Constitution later 
actually did think.  Evidence of the original intent may take many forms.  
But the classic method of determining the original intent is to look at 
what the Framers said about the Constitution during debates at the Con-
stitutional Convention.11 
A second kind of original meaning, which I will call the “original 
understanding,” refers to what the persons who participated in the state 
ratifying conventions thought that the Constitution meant.12  This origi-
nal understanding may differ somewhat from the original intent for a 
simple reason: the Constitutional Convention met in secret and its 
records did not become public until many years after ratification of the 
Constitution.13  As a result, the ratifiers—except for the small percentage 
 
 9. The six paragraphs in Part II are adapted from my guide to the Federalist Papers previously 
published in the Boston University Law Review.  See id. at 805–07.  I reprise them here in a slightly 
altered form for the convenience of the readers. 
 10. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838). 
 11. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 808–09 (1995) (quoting comments 
of James Madison at the Constitutional Convention as evidence of the original intent of the Framers). 
 12. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716–19 (1999) (discussing evidence of the “original under-
standing” of the ratifiers of the Constitution). 
 13. Max Farrand’s classic THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1937) (4 volumes) contains all the notes and records of the Constitutional Convention 
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who previously had participated in the Constitutional Convention, a sub-
ject discussed in depth below—could not know exactly what the Framers 
intended.  The ratifiers accordingly may have attached to the Constitu-
tion meanings different from those intended by the Framers.  For exam-
ple, consider the federal treaty power.  Notes taken at the Constitutional 
Convention suggest that some of the Framers intended that treaties nor-
mally would be self-executing (i.e., they would not require implementing 
legislation), but records from the state ratifying conventions indicate that 
some of the ratifiers of the Constitution had exactly the opposite under-
standing.14 
A third kind of original meaning, which I call the “original objective 
meaning” (and which is also known as the “original public meaning”15), is 
the reasonable meaning of the text of the Constitution at the time of the 
framing.16  This meaning is not necessarily what Hamilton, Madison, or 
the other Framers subjectively intended and not necessarily what the 
numerous participants at the ratification debates actually understood, 
but instead what a reasonable person of the era would have thought.  It is 
a hypothetical meaning that someone reading the Constitution in 1787 or 
1788 might have understood the document to mean.  Justice Antonin 
Scalia tends to consider this meaning the most significant.  He has writ-
ten: “What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a 
statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen 
intended.”17  The standard way of discerning this objective meaning is to 
look at a variety of writings from the founding period to discern the cus-
tomary meaning of words and phrases in the Constitution.18 
Writers have debated extensively the question of which of these 
kinds of original meaning has the greatest legal significance.  Some assert 
that the original understanding is more important than the original in-
tent.19  Others argue that the original objective meaning is the most im-
portant.20  The issue has considerable importance because, as explained 
 
known as of 1937.  The introduction contains an extremely detailed account of who took the notes, 
when they were published, and why they may contain inaccuracies.  Id. at xi–xxv. 
 14. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Orig-
inal Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2037–40, 2074 (1999) (summarizing conflicting views at 
the Constitutional Convention and the state ratifying conventions). 
 15. Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 911 
(2008). 
 16. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 100–09 (2004) (describing 
this kind of meaning). 
 17. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Fed-
eral Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 38 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 18. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 101, 111–25 (2001) (using the methodology to determine whether the word “commerce” in the 
Commerce Clause refers specifically to the exchange of goods or more broadly to any gainful activity). 
 19. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 214–15 (1980); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the 
Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512 (1988). 
 20. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002). 
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above, the three kinds of original meaning conceivably could differ from 
each other.  But I do not address this question here.  Rather, I consider 
separately all three different possible kinds of original meaning on 
grounds that some users of this guide may be interested in all of them. 
A related question is why does the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion matter?  Certainly readers will have differing opinions on the ques-
tion of whether or when courts must follow the original meaning of the 
Constitution.21  But I also do not address that debate in this guide.  In-
stead, I simply assume that anyone looking at this guide either wants to 
cite the records of the state ratifying conventions as a source of the origi-
nal meaning of the Constitution or needs to assess or respond to some-
one else’s citation of these records.  For that, a writer needs to know de-
tails about the records, the theories for citing them, and the grounds for 
impeaching claims based on them—even if the writer disagrees about the 
extent to which the original meaning of the Constitution binds the courts. 
III. SOURCES 
Anyone who wishes to use, or evaluate someone else’s use of, the 
records of the state ratifying conventions should consult both primary 
and secondary sources.  The primary sources are the records themselves, 
which are now available in compilations published both in print and on 
the Internet.22  But determining what happened during the ratification 
process just by looking at the records of the state ratifying conventions is 
very difficult because the records are not self-explanatory or complete.  
Accordingly, I also recommend considering certain secondary sources for 
background information. 
Primary Sources 
Legal scholars doing primary research tend to look in three main 
collections of the records of the state ratification debates.  The first im-
portant collection is Elliot’s Debates, which Jonathan Elliot published in 
four volumes between 1827 and 1830.23  This collection is readily availa-
 
 21. For classic defenses of originalism—the school of constitutional interpretation advocating 
that courts must follow the original meaning of the Constitution—see generally RAOUL BERGER, 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (2d Liberty Fund ed. 1997) (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING 
OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1st Touchstone ed. 1991) (1990); Lino A. 
Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631 (1993); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: 
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).  For classic criticism of originalism, see generally Boris 
I. Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The Recent Past, 77 CAL. L. REV. 
235 (1989); Brest, supra note 19; H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). 
 22. See infra notes 23–35 and accompanying text. 
 23. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 (J. 
Elliot ed., 1827–1830) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES], available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/ 
amlaw/lwed.html. 
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ble.  Not only do most law school libraries contain versions of the work, 
but the Library of Congress Web site contains the full text in both sear-
chable and image form.24  Because Elliot’s Debates has been around for a 
long time, it has been frequently cited by judges and lawyers.25 
But Elliot’s Debates has some important limitations.  The collection 
contains only minimal descriptions of the documents that it contains, 
making it difficult to know what weight to give them.  In addition, some 
experts have questioned Jonathan Elliot’s qualifications and motives.  
James H. Hutson, the former chief of the manuscript division of the Li-
brary of Congress, explains: 
Elliot was not a scholar.  Rather, he was a Washington political 
journalist turned editor, whose press was for sale to the highest bid-
der. . . . Some scholars believe that one of Elliot’s purposes in pre-
paring his Debates was to advance Calhoun’s cause, for Elliot sup-
plemented proceedings in the conventions with such states’ rights 
classics as the Virginia and Kentucky Resolves and deleted from the 
1836 second edition a letter from Madison, which appeared in the 
first edition, attacking nullification.26 
The second important source is the excellent multivolume Docu-
mentary History of the Ratification of the U.S. Constitution.27  Edited by 
John P. Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino, Richard Leffler, Charles H. 
Schoenleber, and Margaret A. Hogan, and published by the Madison 
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, this remarkable work has several 
outstanding features.  Unlike Elliot’s Debates, truly expert historians 
have compiled it.  In addition, the collection is far more complete than 
Elliot’s Debates, containing all known primary materials.  Quite helpful-
ly, the collection also has introductory essays that amply explain the doc-
uments it includes.28 
But the Documentary History has its own limitations.  Most impor-
tantly, the collection is not yet complete.  Since 1976, the editors have 
prepared twenty-two thick volumes, but forthcoming volumes are still in 
the works for Rhode Island, North Carolina, Maryland, and New Hamp-
shire.  In addition, the collection is not as easily available as Elliot’s De-
bates.  The printed volumes are expensive, so major libraries often have 
only one copy.  In my own experience, most of the volumes are usually 
checked out of law school libraries because so many faculty members 
 
 24. Library of Congress, Elliot’s Debates Home Page, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/ 
lwed.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009). 
 25. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Briscoe v. Bank of Commonwealth of 
Ky., 36 U.S. 257 (1837); James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Docu-
mentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13 (1986). 
 26. Hutson, supra note 25, at 13, 20. 
 27. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (John P. Ka-
minski et al. eds., 1976–2007) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY], available at http://www. 
wisconsinhistory.org/ratification/. 
 28. See 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 72. 
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want to use them.  Although the publisher maintains a Web site,29 it un-
fortunately does not contain the full text of the collection. 
The key third source is The Founders’ Constitution, edited by Philip 
K. Kurland and Ralph Lerner.30  This superb work collects important ex-
cerpts from many different sources of evidence of the original meaning 
of the Constitution, including records of the state ratifying conventions.  
The collection organizes the excerpts according to individual clauses in 
the Constitution.  For example, Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution 
confers all legislative power on Congress.31  The Founders’ Constitution 
contains the text of ten historical sources that shed light on the meaning 
of this clause.32  These ten sources include quotations of remarks made 
by Alexander Hamilton about Article I, Section 1 at the New York rati-
fying convention33 and comments that William R. Davie and James Ire-
dell made about it at the North Carolina ratifying convention.34 
The Founders’ Constitution has three main advantages.  First, the 
collection is very reliable and professionally done.  Second, the work is 
the easiest and fastest of the three collections to use.  The editors’ careful 
selection of sources saves the reader the effort of working through hun-
dreds of pages of records to find materials pertinent to the meaning of 
particular clauses.  Third, the work is readily available.  Not only do most 
law school libraries have the collection, but the University of Chicago 
Press generously has put an edition of the work on the Internet.35 
But the Founders’ Constitution also has limitations.  The compila-
tion is not complete.  Instead, the editors have chosen to include what 
they consider, in their expert judgment, the most significant passages 
from historical sources.  In addition, the work contains very little expla-
nation about the sources it includes. 
Secondary Sources on the Ratification Process 
I recommend three secondary sources that explain the ratification 
process in depth.  The first is volume II of Professor Francis Newton 
Thorpe’s classic, The Constitutional History of the United States, pub-
lished in 1902.36  Although long out of print, the full text is available for 
 
 29. Wisconsin Historical Society, The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitu-
tion, http://www.wisconsinhistory.org/ratification/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2009) (table of contents showing 
completed volumes and works still in progress). 
 30. THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), available at 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/. 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of 
the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”). 
 32. See 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 30, at 24–40. 
 33. Id. at 36. 
 34. Id. at 36–37. 
 35. The Founders’ Constitution, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/ (last visited Feb. 8, 
2009). 
 36. 2 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
(1901), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=Lew9AAAAIAAJ. 
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free in searchable form on the Internet at Google Books.37  The distin-
guished author recounts, in 170 pages, the story of how the Constitution 
was ratified in the states from Delaware through Rhode Island.  Al-
though the author did not have all of the sources now available, the book 
still provides a comprehensive and understandable account, with many 
useful citations to Elliot’s Debates. 
The second recommended secondary source is The Constitution and 
the States: The Role of the Original Thirteen in the Framing and Adoption 
of the Constitution.38  This work, published in 1988 as part of the celebra-
tion of the Constitution’s bicentennial anniversary celebration, contains 
thirteen essays written by distinguished historians and edited by Patrick 
T. Conley and John P. Kaminski.  Each essay describes, among other 
things, the ratification process for a state and identifies the available his-
torical sources. 
The third recommended secondary source is the Documentary His-
tory of the Ratification of the U.S. Constitution, discussed above.39  In ad-
dition to compiling primary sources, this multivolume work also contains 
lengthy essays about the ratification process and the available historical 
sources.  It is the reference that serious historians consult, but it may 
provide more information than legal professionals are seeking. 
IV. OVERVIEW OF RATIFICATION IN THE STATES 
In February 1787, Congress under the Articles of Confederation 
called for a convention to be held 
for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confe-
deration and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such 
alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Con-
gress and confirmed by the states render the federal constitution 
adequate to the exigencies of Government & the preservation of 
the Union.40 
This convention subsequently has become known as the “Constitutional 
Convention” or “Philadelphia Convention” or simply the federal conven-
tion of 1787.41 
The federal convention met from May 14, 1787, to September 17, 
1787.42  During this time, the delegates departed from the mission that 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN THE 
FRAMING AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1988) 
[hereinafter THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES]. 
 39. See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27. 
 40. Report of Proceedings in Congress, Feb. 21, 1787, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE 
FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 44–45 (Charles C. Tansill ed., 1927) (H.R. 
Doc. No. 69-398).  Some of the states sent deputies under different instructions. 
 41. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 13, at i–xxv (intro-
ductory essay describing the federal convention). 
 42. Id. 
MAGGS.DOC 2/23/2009  4:03 PM 
No. 2] RECORDS OF STATE RATIFYING CONVENTIONS 467 
Congress had given.  The convention did not simply draft “alterations” 
for the Articles of Confederation as amendments.  Instead, it proposed 
an entirely new Constitution to replace the Articles of Confederation.43  
When it completed its work, the federal convention did not ask Congress 
or the state legislatures to approve the Constitution.  Instead, perhaps 
fearing delay and possible defeat in the legislatures, the federal conven-
tion called for ratifying conventions to be held in each state.44  Although 
this arrangement stripped Congress and the state legislatures of some 
power,45 they did not block the procedure.  Congress promptly submitted 
the draft to state legislatures.  As discussed in depth below, the state leg-
islatures then debated about whether, when, and how to hold ratifying 
conventions, and the conventions then began to meet. 
Article VII of the Constitution specified that the Constitution 
would not go into effect until nine states had ratified it.46  At that point, it 
would establish a new government among the ratifying states.  In reading 
the description of the ratification process, keep in mind that in 1787 and 
1788, no one knew whether the Constitution would be ratified or not.  
The issue was contentious, and proponents and opponents each had 
strong arguments.  Delegates who supported the ratification became 
known as “Federalists,”47 while delegates who opposed it were called 
“Anti-Federalists.”48  Table 1 shows the important dates and final votes: 
TABLE 1 
STATE RATIFYING CONVENTIONS (IN ORDER OF RATIFICATION) 
 Convention Called Met Ratified Vote 
1 Delaware Nov. 10, 
1787
Dec. 3–7, 
1787
Dec. 7, 
1787
30–0 
2 Pennsylvania Sept. 29, 
1787 
Nov. 20–
Dec. 15, 
1787
Dec. 12, 
1787 
46–23 
3 New Jersey Nov. 1, 
1787
Dec. 11–19, 
1787
Dec. 18, 
1787
38–0 
(Continued on next page) 
 
 
 
 43. Id. at 1; see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 13, at 
641–50. 
 44. See U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 45. If the Convention had proposed mere amendments to the Articles of Confederation, the 
amendments would have become effective only if the Confederation Congress or the state legislatures 
unanimously approved them. 
 46. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 47. Isaac Kramnick, Editor’s Introduction to JAMES MADISON ET AL., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 
15 (Isaac Kramnick ed., Penguin Books 1987) (1788). 
 48. Id. 
MAGGS.DOC 2/23/2009  4:03 PM 
468 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2009 
TABLE 1—Continued 
 Convention Called Met Ratified Vote 
4 Georgia Oct. 26, 
1787 
Dec. 25, 
1787–Jan. 
5, 1788
Jan. 2, 
1788 
26–0 
5 Connecticut Oct. 16, 
1787
Jan. 3–9, 
1788
Jan. 9, 
1788
128–40 
6 Massachusetts Oct. 25, 
1787
Jan. 9–Feb. 
7, 1788
Feb. 6, 
1788
187–
168 
7 Maryland Nov. 27, 
1787
Apr. 21–28, 
1788
Apr. 28, 
1788
63–11 
8 South 
Carolina 
Jan. 18, 
1788
May 12–24, 
1788
May 23, 
1788
149–73 
9 New 
Hampshire 
Dec. 14, 
1787 
Feb. 13–22 
& June 18–
21, 1788
June 21, 
1788 
57–47 
10 Virginia Oct. 31, 
1787
June 2–27, 
1788
June 25, 
1788
89–79 
11 New York Feb. 1, 
1787 
June 17–
July 26, 
1788
July 26, 
1788 
30–27 
12 North 
Carolina 
Dec. 6, 
1787 & 
Nov. 30, 
1788 
July 21–
Aug. 4, 
1788 & 
Nov. 16–23, 
1789 
Nov. 21, 
1789 
195–77 
13 Rhode Island Jan. 17, 
1790 
Mar. 1–6, 
1790 & 
May 25–29, 
1790
May 29, 
1790 
34–32 
Delaware 
Delaware was the first state to ratify the Constitution.49  The Dela-
ware legislature voted on November 10, 1787 to hold a ratifying conven-
tion.50  The convention met in Dover from December 3–7, 1787.51  On 
December 7, by a vote of 30–0, the delegates unanimously approved the 
 
 49. For more detailed information about Delaware’s ratification, see 3 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 27, at 37–49; Harold Hancock, Delaware Becomes the First State, in THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 38, at 21, 30–35; 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 18. 
 50. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 28. 
 51. Id. at 105. 
MAGGS.DOC 2/23/2009  4:03 PM 
No. 2] RECORDS OF STATE RATIFYING CONVENTIONS 469 
Constitution.52  These delegates included Gunning Bedford Jr. and Ri-
chard Bassett, who had represented Delaware at the federal conven-
tion.53 
We know very little about what transpired at the Delaware conven-
tion because no records of the debates exist.  Remarkably, the conven-
tion may have discussed the question of whether to ratify the Constitu-
tion for only a few hours.54  The Delaware convention’s rapid decision 
suggests that the delegates saw the Constitution as a clear improvement 
over the Articles of Confederation.  But given the absence of any record 
of the state ratifying convention’s debate, we can only speculate about 
the exact reasons leading the delegates to this conclusion.  Unlike many 
other states, Delaware did not propose any amendments to the Constitu-
tion. 
Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania was the second state to ratify the Constitution.55  The 
Pennsylvania legislature decided on September 29, 1787, to hold a ratify-
ing convention.56  The convention met from November 20 to December 
15, 1787.57  On December 12, 1787, the convention approved the Consti-
tution by a vote of 46–23.58  James Wilson was the only member of the 
federal convention who participated in the Pennsylvania ratifying con-
vention.59 
One of the most interesting aspects of Pennsylvania’s ratification is 
how the Anti-Federalists tried to block the calling of a ratification con-
vention.60  The story begins on the morning of September 28, 1787—just 
eleven days after the federal convention had completed its work.  George 
Clymer, a member of the state legislature and one of the delegates to the 
federal convention, moved for the calling of a ratifying convention.61  
That afternoon, before a vote was taken, Anti-Federalist opponents of 
the proposal departed from the legislature and thus denied the body a 
quorum.62  But the next day, a mob found some of the absent members 
 
 52. Id. at 110–12. 
 53. See 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 18 n.2. 
 54. Hancock, supra note 49, at 32–35. 
 55. For more detailed information about Pennsylvania’s ratification, see 2 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 27, at 30–49; Paul Doutrich, From Revolution to Constitution: Pennsylvania’s 
Path to Federalism, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 38, at 37, 48–51; 2 THORPE, 
supra note 36, at 18–32. 
 56. 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 19. 
 57. Id. at 18, 27. 
 58. Id. at 26. 
 59. Id. at 21. 
 60. See Doutrich, supra note 55, at 51. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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and forcibly took them back to the meeting hall, where a quorum was es-
tablished.63  The legislature then voted to hold a ratifying convention.64 
Extensive records of the Pennsylvania convention exist.  These 
records include journals of the convention, various newspaper accounts 
of the proceedings, and notes taken by the participants and observers.65  
Elliot’s Debates contains 127 pages of debates.66  James Wilson, who had 
played an important role at the federal convention, took the lead in ar-
guing for ratification of the Constitution in Pennsylvania.  Although Wil-
son made many fine points, he is perhaps best known for his somewhat 
over-the-top argument for why the Constitution was not deficient despite 
its lack of a bill of rights.  “In a government possessed of enumerated 
powers,” he said, “such a measure would be not only unnecessary, but 
preposterous and dangerous.”67  About ten months after ratification, on 
September 3, 1788, a conference of delegates met in Harrisburg and 
drafted twelve proposed amendments for correcting perceived problems 
with the Constitution.68 
New Jersey 
Less than a week after Pennsylvania’s convention concluded, New 
Jersey became the third state to ratify the Constitution.69  The New Jer-
sey legislature called for a ratifying convention on November 1, 1787.70  
The convention met from December 11–19, 1787.71  On December 18, 
1787, the delegates voted to approve the Constitution by a vote of 38–0.72  
The only delegate who also had served in the federal convention was 
David Brearly.73 
No records exist of the debates in the New Jersey convention.74  A 
newspaper article of the time suggests that the convention analyzed the 
Constitution section-by-section and then debated the question of ratifica-
tion.75  Although we do not know what the delegates discussed, the 
shortness of the convention and the unanimous vote for ratification show 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 59. 
 66. See 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 415–542. 
 67. Id. at 436. 
 68. See id. at 542–46; 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 27. 
 69. For more detailed information about New Jersey’s ratification, see 3 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 27, at 119–32; Mary R. Murrin, New Jersey and the Two Constitutions, in THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 38, at 55, 71–74; 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 32–33. 
 70. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 21. 
 71. See Murrin, supra note 69, at 72–73. 
 72. See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 130. 
 73. See 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 32–33. 
 74. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 127 (“Letters, notes of debates, or diaries writ-
ten by members of the Convention or by observers are not extant.”). 
 75. See Murrin, supra note 69, at 72. 
MAGGS.DOC 2/23/2009  4:03 PM 
No. 2] RECORDS OF STATE RATIFYING CONVENTIONS 471 
strong support for the Constitution.  New Jersey did not propose any 
amendments to the Constitution. 
Georgia 
Georgia was the fourth state to ratify the Constitution.76  The Geor-
gia legislature called for a ratifying convention on October 26, 1787.77  
The convention convened on Christmas Day 1787, discussed the Consti-
tution for about a week, and then unanimously ratified it on January 2, 
1788.78  The only member of the state convention who had participated in 
the federal convention was William Few.79  Interestingly, the Georgia 
convention did not know that Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey 
already had ratified the Constitution; the Georgia delegates may well 
have thought that they were the first to ratify.80 
As with New Jersey and Delaware, we have almost no records of 
the Georgia convention.  According to the leading authority, “No diaries 
or notes of debates by members of the Convention exist, and only one 
letter, written by Joseph Habersham, sheds any light on the Convention 
proceedings.”81  But despite this inadequate record, the reasons for 
Georgia’s ratification are easily surmised.  Georgia was a rural state, hav-
ing a small population and substantial problems in its security.  George 
Washington himself wrote in reference to Georgia’s pending ratification 
decision: “[I]f a weak State, with powerful tribes of Indians in its rear, & 
the Spaniards on its flank, do not incline to embrace a strong general 
Government, there must, I should think, be either wickedness, or insani-
ty in their conduct.”82  Georgia did not propose any amendments to the 
Constitution. 
Connecticut 
Connecticut’s ratification came fifth.83  The Connecticut legislature 
called for a ratifying convention on October 16, 1787.84  The ratifying 
convention met from January 3–9, 1788.85  The delegates ratified the 
 
 76. For more detailed information about Georgia’s ratification, see 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 
supra note 27, at 201–16; Albert B. Saye, Georgia: Security Through Union, in THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE STATES, supra note 38, at 77, 86–90; 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 33. 
 77. See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 219. 
 78. Id. at 278. 
 79. See 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 33. 
 80. See id. 
 81. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 213. 
 82. Saye, supra note 76, at 86–87. 
 83. For more detailed information about Connecticut’s ratification, see 3 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 27, at 315–38; Christopher Collier, Sovereignty Finessed: Roger Sherman, Oliver 
Ellsworth, and the Ratification of the Constitution in Connecticut, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
STATES, supra note 38, at 93, 108–11; 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 33–37. 
 84. 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 34. 
 85. Id. at 35–36. 
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Constitution on January 9, 1788, by a vote of 128–40.86  Three of the del-
egates, Roger Sherman, Oliver Ellsworth, and William Samuel Johnson, 
had represented Connecticut at the federal convention.87 
The Connecticut convention did not keep an official journal of its 
proceedings.  But some of what was said is recorded because several 
newspapers reprinted accounts of the debates.88  Elliot’s Debates contains 
a total of eighteen pages of speeches from the debates89 that the editor 
“[c]ollected from contemporary publications.”90 
These records suggest that one of the major concerns of opponents 
of the Constitution in Connecticut was that Congress had excessive taxa-
tion power.  Oliver Ellsworth eloquently responded to this objection by 
insisting that taxation was necessary for national defense: 
Wars have now become rather wars of the purse than of the sword.  
Government must therefore be able to command the whole power 
of the purse; otherwise a hostile nation may look into our Constitu-
tion, see what resources are in the power of government, and calcu-
late to go a little beyond us; thus they may obtain a decided supe-
riority over us, and reduce us to the utmost distress.  A government 
which can command but half its resources is like a man with but one 
arm to defend himself.91 
This enduring reasoning about the nature of warfare may have 
struck the delegates as sound.  But it is not clear how much arguments 
mattered.  Seven of the towns that sent delegates to the Connecticut rati-
fying convention instructed them to reject the Constitution.92  Their posi-
tions thus already had hardened.  Connecticut did not propose any 
amendments to the Constitution. 
Massachusetts 
Massachusetts was the sixth state to ratify the Constitution.93  The 
Massachusetts legislature called for a ratifying convention on October 25, 
1787.94  The convention met from January 9 to February 7, 1788.95  On 
February 6, 1788, the delegates voted to ratify the Constitution by a vote 
of 187–168.96 
 
 86. 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 322 (describing the vote). 
 87. See 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 34. 
 88. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at 336. 
 89. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 185–202. 
 90. Id. at 185. 
 91. Id. at 191. 
 92. See Collier, supra note 83, at 109. 
 93. 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at xix.  For more detailed information about 
Massachusetts’s ratification, see 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at xxiv–lxxiii; John J. Fox, 
Massachusetts and the Creation of the Federal Union, 1775–1791, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
STATES, supra note 38, at 113, 121–27; 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 37–56. 
 94. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at lxxiii. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
MAGGS.DOC 2/23/2009  4:03 PM 
No. 2] RECORDS OF STATE RATIFYING CONVENTIONS 473 
The Massachusetts convention was the largest in terms of the num-
ber of delegates.  These delegates included many prominent figures.  
John Hancock, who at the time was also the governor of Massachusetts, 
led the convention, and John and Samuel Adams both took part.97  Three 
of the delegates, Rufus King, Nathaniel Gorham, and Caleb Strong, had 
participated in the federal convention.98  In addition, the convention in-
vited Elbridge Gerry to speak.99  Gerry had participated in the federal 
convention as a delegate from Massachusetts but had refused to sign the 
Constitution; predictably, he spoke against ratification.100 
Although the campaign for ratification succeeded, the result easily 
might have been different.  As Francis Newton Thorpe has observed, 
nine Anti-Federalist delegates were absent, and forty-six towns (most of 
which probably were Anti-Federalist in sentiment) did not send dele-
gates.101  Failure of the Constitution in Massachusetts, a large and politi-
cally important state, might have scuttled the chance for ratification in 
subsequent states. 
The Massachusetts convention kept extensive records of the pro-
ceedings.  Official documents include the records of the votes taken, cop-
ies of many speeches, and accounts of debates.  In addition, newspapers 
reported various aspects of the convention.  And the delegates them-
selves kept notes of some of their speeches.  The Documentary History of 
the Ratification of the U.S. Constitution identifies and contains these 
sources.102  Elliot’s Debates includes 183 pages of debates.103 
As in other states, many Anti-Federalists objected to the lack of a 
bill of rights.  Some delegates at the Massachusetts convention, however, 
also opposed the Constitution because it sanctioned slavery: 
Mr. NEAL (from Kittery) [repeated the objection] that the slave 
trade was allowed to be continued for twenty years.  His profession, 
he said, obliged him to bear witness against any thing that should 
favor the making merchandise of the bodies of men, and, unless his 
objection was removed, he could not put his hand to the Constitu-
tion.  Other gentlemen said, in addition to this idea, that there was 
not even a proposition that the negroes ever shall be free; and Gen. 
THOMPSON exclaimed, Mr. President, shall it be said that, after 
we have established our own independence and freedom, we make 
slaves of others?  O!  [George] Washington, what a name has he 
had!  How he has immortalized himself!  But he holds those in sla-
very who have as good a right to be free as he has.104 
 
 97. See 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 38. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. at 41. 
 100. See id. at 39, 41. 
 101. See id. at 54. 
 102. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at lviii–lxi. 
 103. See generally 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 1–183. 
 104. Id. at 107. 
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In the end, though, these sentiments did not prevail, and Massachu-
setts ratified the Constitution.  The ratifying document included pro-
posed amendments aimed at correcting perceived problems in the Con-
stitution (but nothing related to slavery).105 
Maryland 
Maryland was the seventh state to ratify the Constitution.106  The 
Maryland legislature called for a ratifying convention on November 27, 
1787.107  The convention met from April 21–28, 1788.108  On April 28, 
1788, its delegates ratified the Constitution by a vote of 63–11.109  The 
outcome, as in some other states, was somewhat foreordained by the del-
egate selection process.  In elections, sixty-four Federalist delegates were 
chosen but only twelve Anti-Federalists.110  The delegates included all 
three of Maryland’s representatives at the federal convention: James 
McHenry, Luther Martin, and John F. Mercer.  Of these men, only 
McHenry voted for ratification; Martin and Mercer opposed it.111 
Few records exist from the Maryland convention.  Elliot’s Debates 
contains only ten pages.112  But the absence of more records probably is 
not very significant.  Very little discussion actually occurred in Maryland.  
The Federalist majority, sensing victory from the outset, blocked debate 
over individual sections of the Constitution and discussions about the 
need to amend the Constitution.113  The Federalists’ only concession was 
to allow the leading Anti-Federalist in Maryland, former Governor Wil-
liam Paca, to submit some proposed amendments to a committee in ex-
change for his agreeing to vote for ratification.114  But the convention ad-
journed without voting on these amendments.115 
 
 105. See 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 322–23. 
 106. For more detailed information about Maryland’s ratification, see Gregory Stiverson, Necessi-
ty, the Mother of Union: Maryland and the Constitution, 1785–1789, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
STATES, supra note 38, at 131, 144–72; 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 56–60.  The volume of the 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION that will contain mate-
rials from the Maryland ratifying convention is not yet complete.  See Wisconsin Historical Society, 
supra note 29. 
 107. The vote took place on April 26, 1788.  See 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 56.  Maryland’s rati-
fication document is dated April 28, 1788.  See 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 324. 
 108. 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 57 n.2. 
 109. See id. at 59. 
 110. Stiverson, supra note 106, at 146. 
 111. 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 59. 
 112. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 547–56. 
 113. Stiverson, supra note 106, at 147. 
 114. Id. at 149. 
 115. 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 59–60. 
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South Carolina 
South Carolina’s ratification came eighth.116  The South Carolina 
legislature called for a ratifying convention on January 18, 1788.117  The 
convention met from May 12–24, 1788.118  On May 23, 1788, the delegates 
ratified the Constitution by a vote of 149–73.119  Three delegates at the 
state ratifying convention also had participated in the federal convention: 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, and John Rutledge.120 
Some records of the South Carolina convention exist.  Elliot’s De-
bates contains eighty-nine pages of speeches, debates, and records of 
votes.121  Discussion at the convention mostly focused on trade and eco-
nomic matters.122  Many speakers repeated the common idea that the Ar-
ticles of Confederation simply did not give the federal government suffi-
cient power to raise and spend money and regulate commerce.  Consider, 
for example, these remarks: 
Hon. E. RUTLEDGE . . . thought that Confederation so very 
weak, so very inadequate to the purposes of the Union, that, unless 
it was materially altered, the sun of American independence would 
indeed soon set—never to rise again. What could be effected for 
America under [the Articles of Confederation]?  Could it obtain se-
curity for our commerce in any part of the world?  Could it force 
obedience to any one law of the Union?  Could it obtain one shil-
ling of money for the discharge of the most honorable obliga-
tions? . . . Was there a single power in Europe that would lend us a 
guinea on the faith of that Confederation?123 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the South Carolina ratifying 
convention is that the delegates did not fairly represent the people of the 
state.  The low-lying areas on the coast, which were more concerned with 
trade and supported ratification, were entitled to a disproportionate 
number of delegates.124  According to historian Jerome Nadelhaft, “The 
delegates opposed to the Constitution . . . probably represented a majori-
ty of the state population, and Antifederalism was stronger in the state at 
large than the ratification vote indicated.”125  The South Carolina conven-
 
 116. For more detailed information about South Carolina’s ratification, see Jerome J. Nadelhaft, 
South Carolina: A Conservative Revolution, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 38, at 
153, 172–75; 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 60–73.  The volume of the DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION that will contain materials from the South Carolina ratify-
ing convention is not yet complete.  See Wisconsin Historical Society, supra note 29. 
 117. 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 68 n.5. 
 118. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at xlii. 
 119. Nadelhaft, supra note 116, at 175. 
 120. 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 69. 
 121. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 253–342. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. at 274–75. 
 124. Nadelhaft, supra note 116, at 159. 
 125. Id. at 175. 
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tion at the time of ratification also proposed four amendments to the 
Constitution.126 
New Hampshire 
New Hampshire was the ninth state to ratify the Constitution,127 
causing the Constitution to go into effect under the terms of Article VII.  
The New Hampshire legislature voted to hold a convention on Decem-
ber 14, 1787.128  The convention met in two sessions, the first from Febru-
ary 13–22, 1788, and the second from June 18–21, 1788.129  On June 21, 
1788, the delegates voted to approve the Constitution by a vote of 57–
47.130  These delegates included John Langdon, who had participated at 
the federal convention.131 
Unfortunately, very few records of the New Hampshire convention 
exist.  Elliot’s Debates contains only one speech, of questionable prove-
nance, on the subject of the slave trade.132  But some accounts suggest 
that the convention was mostly concerned about the length of terms of 
office, the broad powers of Congress, the limitations on state power, and 
the prohibition on religious tests (which would allow non-Protestants to 
serve in the government).133  At the time of ratification, New Hampshire 
recommended various amendments.134 
Virginia 
Virginia was the tenth state to ratify.135  Although the Constitution 
already had the ratifications of the nine states necessary for it to go into 
effect, Virginia’s vote still had great importance.  The Union would have 
had great difficulty functioning without the support of Virginia, a large 
 
 126. See 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 325 (reprinting amendments). 
 127. For more detailed information about New Hampshire’s ratification, see Jere Daniell, Ideolo-
gy and Hardball: Ratification of the Federal Constitution in New Hampshire, in THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE STATES, supra note 38, at 181, 186–98; 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 73–78.  The volume of the 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION that will contain mate-
rials from the New Hampshire convention is not yet complete.  See Wisconsin Historical Society, supra 
note 29. 
 128. See 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 326 (New Hampshire’s ratification document de-
scribes the legislature’s resolution). 
 129. See Daniell, supra note 127, at 191–98. 
 130. Id. at 198. 
 131. 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 73. 
 132. See 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 203; Hutson, supra note 25, at 21 (explaining that 
the document “appears to have been composed by parties unknown in 1827, when it was first pub-
lished as antislavery propaganda in a New Hampshire newspaper”). 
 133. Daniell, supra note 127, at 193. 
 134. See 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 325–27. 
 135. For more detailed information about Virginia’s ratification, see Alan V. Briceland, Virginia: 
The Cement of the Union, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 38, at 201, 210–21; 8 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at xxiii–liv; 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 79–130. 
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and populous state in the middle of the East Coast.136  The Virginia legis-
lature called for a ratifying convention on October 31, 1787.137  The con-
vention met from June 2–27, 1788.138  On June 25, 1788, the delegates ra-
tified the Constitution by a vote of 89–79.139  These delegates included 
John Blair, James Madison, George Mason, Edmund J. Randolph, and 
George Wythe, all of whom had represented Virginia at the federal con-
vention.140  They joined other important men, including future President 
James Monroe, former governor Patrick Henry, and future members of 
the Supreme Court John Marshall and Bushrod Washington.141 
Extensive records of the Virginia ratifying convention exist.  They 
include the official journal of the convention, various committee reports, 
and contemporary newspaper accounts.142  Elliot’s Debates devotes an en-
tire volume of 663 pages to votes and debates of the Virginia conven-
tion.143  These records are of very high quality and cover discussions of a 
wide range of constitutional issues.  For this reason, scholars and judges 
very frequently consult the Virginia records for evidence of the original 
meaning.144 
The leading Federalist speakers were Governor James Randolph, 
James Madison, and John Marshall.  The leading Anti-Federalists were 
George Mason and Patrick Henry.  Henry spoke more than anyone else.  
In reading Henry’s remarks, one cannot help but notice how accurately 
he predicted the future.  He envisioned heavy federal taxes, a standing 
Army, difficulty amending the Constitution, claims by Congress that the 
Constitution grants implied legislative powers, the eventual liberation of 
the slaves, and more.145  But Henry’s style of debate must have exaspe-
rated his opponents.  According to Thorpe, “[I]t was useless to try to an-
swer Henry in any way, because of his manner of attack; no man could 
tell at what point he would make assault or what provision he would dis-
cuss.”146 
James Madison, who led much of the Federalist response, offered a 
learned justification for the Constitution.147  John Marshall later said, 
“‘Mr. Henry had without doubt the greatest power to persuade,’ while 
 
 136. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2001) (quoting speakers of the era who recognized that a United States that 
did not include Virginia and New York would exist in name only). 
 137. See 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at liii. 
 138. Id. at liv. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 83. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at xlv. 
 143. See 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 1–663. 
 144. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2804 (2008) (referencing Elliot’s De-
bates while explicating the Second Amendment in a recent landmark case). 
 145. See 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 586–96. 
 146. 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 93. 
 147. See 3 ELLIOTT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 616–22. 
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‘Mr. Madison had the greatest power to convince.’”148  But Madison’s 
remarks did not succeed in completely swaying the delegates.  Ultimate-
ly, the Federalists proposed a compromise that led to ratification: the 
convention would vote to ratify, but it would then send a list of proposed 
amendments to Congress.149  Virginia proposed the adoption of a bill of 
rights and numerous amendments.150 
New York 
New York was the eleventh state to ratify the Constitution.151  Its ra-
tification, like that of Virginia, was not essential for the Constitution to 
go into effect, but the Union would have been substantially weakened 
without New York’s support.  The New York legislature called for a con-
vention on February 1, 1787.152  The convention met from June 17 to July 
26, 1788.153  It ultimately ratified the Constitution on July 26, 1788, by a 
vote of 30–27.154  The delegates included Alexander Hamilton, John 
Lansing, and Robert Yates, who had represented New York at the fed-
eral convention.155 
Extensive records preserve the debates at the New York conven-
tion.  Several newspapers published accounts of the convention, and var-
ious delegates and observers took substantial notes.156  Elliot’s Debates 
contain 210 pages of materials.157 
When the New York delegates were selected, it appeared that there 
were nearly twice as many Anti-Federalist delegates as there were Fede-
ralist delegates.158  Governor George Clinton and John Lansing led the 
Anti-Federalist opposition to ratification,159 while Alexander Hamilton 
and John Jay led the Federalists in support.160  Before the convention, 
Hamilton, Jay, and James Madison famously tried to draw support for 
 
 148. JOSEPH ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION: TRIUMPHS AND TRAGEDIES AT THE FOUNDING OF 
THE REPUBLIC 120 (2007). 
 149. See id. at 125. 
 150. See 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 657–61. 
 151. For more detailed information about New York’s ratification of the Constitution, see 19 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at xxii–lxxxvi; John P. Kaminski, Adjusting to Circumstances: 
New York’s Relationship with the Federal Government 1776–1788, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
STATES, supra note 38, at 225, 242–48; 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 131–80. 
 152. See Kaminski, supra note 151, at 240. 
 153. Id. at 242–46. 
 154. Id. at 246. 
 155. See 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 134–35.  Lansing and Yates left the federal convention early 
because they believed that it had departed from its objective of merely amending the Articles of Con-
federation.  See id. at 139. 
 156. 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 27, at lxix–lxx. 
 157. See 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 205–414. 
 158. See RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, SAMUEL ADAMS, PROMOTER OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 331 (1923). 
 159. See CHARLES EMANUEL MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 80 (1926). 
 160. See id. 
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ratification by publishing a series of newspaper essays now called the Fe-
deralist Papers.161 
At the convention, the delegates debated many important topics.  
As one example, Lansing moved that New York should insist, if it were 
to ratify the Constitution, that the state would have a right to secede 
from the Union.162  Hamilton opposed this motion, which ultimately 
failed, on grounds that New York could not make a conditional ratifica-
tion.163 
Although the Federalists made strong arguments, Alexander Ham-
ilton believed that it was really the “circumstances” that had persuaded 
the Anti-Federalists to support ratification.164  The delegates knew that 
most other states had ratified the Constitution, that New York would 
have difficulty remaining outside the Union, and that some localities in 
New York might even attempt to secede from the state if the convention 
did not ratify the Constitution. 
North Carolina 
North Carolina was the twelfth state to ratify the Constitution.165  
The North Carolina legislature first called for a ratifying convention on 
December 6, 1787.166  A convention met in Hillsborough from July 21 to 
August 4, 1788.167  On August 2, 1788, the Anti-Federalists prevailed on a 
resolution proposing amendments to the Constitution, but the conven-
tion left the issue of ratification to be decided at a later time.168 
The North Carolina legislature called for a second convention on 
November 30, 1788.169  The second convention met in Fayetteville from 
November 16–23, 1789, long after the new federal government under the 
Constitution had already come into existence.170  On November 21, 1789, 
the delegates ratified the Constitution by a vote of 195–77.171  The dele-
gates at the second convention included Hugh Williamson, William 
 
 161. See Maggs, supra note 7, at 801–02. 
 162. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 412. 
 163. See Kaminski, supra note 151, at 245. 
 164. See id. at 246. 
 165. For more detailed information about North Carolina’s ratification, see 2 THORPE, supra note 
36, at 180–85; Alan D. Watson, States’ Rights and Agrarianism, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
STATES, supra note 38, at 251, 259–67.  The volume of the DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION that will contain materials from the North Carolina con-
vention is not yet complete.  See Wisconsin Historical Society, supra note 29. 
 166. See Paul J. Scudiere, “In Order to Form a More Perfect Union”: The United States, 1774–
1791, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES, supra note 38, at 3, 18–20. 
 167. 4 GORDON DENBOER ET AL., THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL 
ELECTIONS, 1788–1790, at 313 (1990). 
 168. Watson, supra note 165, at 262. 
 169. 4 DENBOER ET AL., supra note 167, at 313. 
 170. MARTHA HELEN HAYWOOD ET AL., THE NORTH CAROLINA BOOKLET: GREAT EVENTS IN 
NORTH CAROLINA HISTORY 30–31 (1909). 
 171. Id. at 30. 
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Blount, and William R. Davie, who had represented South Carolina at 
the federal convention.172 
Elliot’s Debates contains 252 pages of records of the first North 
Carolina convention.173  But the second North Carolina convention, 
which actually decided to ratify the convention, unfortunately did not 
keep any records of its debates.174  North Carolinians may have decided 
to ratify in part because the new federal government had made an im-
pressive start with George Washington as the President.175  In addition, 
North Carolina realistically may have thought that it could not remain 
outside the Union.  Like other states, North Carolina proposed amend-
ments to the Constitution along with its ratification.176 
Rhode Island 
Rhode Island, which had not sent any delegates to the federal con-
vention, was the last of the original thirteen colonies to ratify the Consti-
tution.177  The legislature initially declined to hold a ratifying convention, 
but instead called for a popular referendum on ratification.178  In the re-
ferendum, held in March 1788, ratification was defeated by a vote of 
2,711–243.179  This lopsided vote against ratification did not accurately re-
flect the true sentiment of the state; many Federalists refused to partici-
pate in the referendum because they believed that the state legislature 
should have called a ratifying convention.180 
Not until January 17, 1790, about a year after the new federal gov-
ernment had begun its operations, did the Rhode Island legislature final-
ly call for a ratifying convention.181  The ratifying convention met in two 
sessions.  The first session ran from March 1–6, 1790.182  This session pro-
duced proposed amendments, which citizens of Rhode Island voted on 
during town meetings.183  The second met from May 25–29, 1790.184  The 
delegates ratified the Constitution on May 29, 1790, by a very close vote 
 
 172. See 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 181. 
 173. See 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 1–252. 
 174. See Watson, supra note 165, at 265. 
 175. See id. at 264. 
 176. See 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 249. 
 177. For more detailed information about Rhode Island’s ratification, see Patrick T. Conley, First 
in War, Last in Peace: Rhode Island and the Constitution, 1786–1790, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
STATES, supra note 38, at 269, 271–79; 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 185–91.  The volume of the 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION that will contain mate-
rials from the Rhode Island convention is not yet complete.  See Wisconsin Historical Society, supra 
note 29. 
 178. See 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 185. 
 179. See Conley, supra note 177, at 274. 
 180. See 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 186. 
 181. Id. at 188–89. 
 182. See Conley, supra note 177, at 276–77. 
 183. 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 190–91. 
 184. Id. 
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of 34–32.185  Three delegates, who apparently opposed ratification, missed 
the vote and thus may have allowed those supporting ratification to pre-
vail.186 
Elliot’s Debates includes Rhode Island’s final ratification document 
and proposed amendments to the Constitution, but no records exist of 
the debates at either the first or second session of the Rhode Island con-
vention.187  But Thorpe reports, without citation, that the delegates 
formed a committee that went through the Constitution paragraph by 
paragraph.188  One delegate apparently complained about the taxation 
provisions, while another expressed concern about the continuation of 
slavery.189 
Summary 
The foregoing discussion shows that extensive records of debates 
exist for four state ratifying conventions: Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, 
Virginia, and New York.  Fragmentary records of debates exist for four 
states: Connecticut, Maryland, South Carolina, and New Hampshire.  No 
records of debates exist for Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, North Caro-
lina (i.e., the second North Carolina convention, which ratified the Con-
stitution), and Rhode Island.  Eight states proposed amendments to the 
Constitution at the time of ratification: Massachusetts, Maryland, South 
Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North Carolina, and 
Rhode Island.  Delegates to the federal convention participated in all of 
the state conventions except Rhode Island (which did not send any dele-
gates to the federal convention). 
V. HOW RECORDS OF THE STATE RATIFYING CONVENTIONS MIGHT 
PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF THE ORIGINAL MEANING 
Judges, lawyers, and legal scholars have cited the records of the 
state ratification conventions for several different purposes.  Some have 
looked to remarks at the state conventions for evidence of the original 
understanding of the ratifiers.  Others have cited state convention 
records to show the original intent of the Framers who drafted the Con-
stitution at the federal convention.  Still others have used the records as 
evidence of the original objective meaning of the Constitution’s text.  Fi-
nally, many have looked to the records of the state conventions for con-
text in which to understand the subsequent amendment of the Constitu-
tion by the Bill of Rights.  The following discussion provides examples of 
each of these practices and describes the theories supporting them.  (Part 
 
 185. Id. at 191. 
 186. See Conley, supra note 177, at 278. 
 187. See 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 334–37. 
 188. See 2 THORPE, supra note 36, at 190. 
 189. See id. 
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VI of this Article then addresses possible grounds for impeaching claims 
about the original meaning.) 
Original Understanding of the Ratifiers 
As discussed above, one form of the original meaning of the Consti-
tution is the meaning that the delegates at the state ratifying conventions 
understood the Constitution to have.  Probably no evidence could help to 
establish this meaning more clearly than the records of the state ratifica-
tion conventions.  Put simply, statements by the delegates in the ratifying 
conventions generally indicate what the delegates understood the Consti-
tution to mean. 
One example concerns the important question of whether the ratifi-
ers of the Constitution understood Article III to allow state governments 
to assert sovereign immunity in federal court.  Article III of the Constitu-
tion expressly grants the federal courts jurisdiction in cases “between a 
State and Citizens of another State.”190  The word “between” creates an 
important ambiguity.  In saying “between,” does Article III mean any 
lawsuit between a state and a citizen of another state, regardless of 
whether the state is the plaintiff or the defendant?  Or does it instead 
mean only a lawsuit between a state and a citizen of another state in 
which the state is the plaintiff? 
At the Virginia ratifying convention, delegate John Marshall, who 
later became Chief Justice of the United States, addressed this question: 
With respect to disputes between a state and the citizens of another 
state, its jurisdiction has been decried with unusual vehemence.  I 
hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the 
bar of the federal court.  Is there no such case at present?  Are 
there not many cases in which the legislature of Virginia is a party, 
and yet the state is not sued?  It is not rational to suppose that the 
sovereign power should be dragged before a court.  The intent is, to 
enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other 
states.  I contend this construction is warranted by the words.191 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly cited this statement from the Virginia 
convention as evidence that the original understanding of the Constitu-
tion was that states would have sovereign immunity and that they could 
not be held liable to citizens of other states in Article III courts.192 
Original Intent of the Framers 
The records of the state ratifying conventions also may provide evi-
dence of the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution.  In other 
 
 190. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 191. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 555. 
 192. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 267 (1985); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 
U.S. 313, 324 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14 (1890). 
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words, the records may show what the delegates to the federal conven-
tion intended the Constitution to mean.  This is possible because, as de-
scribed in Part IV above, delegates to the federal convention also served 
as delegates to the state ratifying conventions in every state except 
Rhode Island. 
In some instances, delegates to the state ratification conventions 
who had previously participated in the federal convention made state-
ments in which they explicitly discussed what the Framers at the federal 
convention had intended.  At the Pennsylvania convention, for example, 
James Wilson spoke at length about why the federal convention had not 
included a bill of rights.193  Wilson explained that some delegates at the 
federal convention had not considered the issue and that others thought 
that including a bill of rights was unnecessary because the federal gov-
ernment had limited powers.194  Wilson also argued against the sugges-
tion that Congress’s power to regulate elections195 “was intended to carry 
on [the federal] government after the state governments should be dis-
solved and abrogated.”196  James Madison, likewise, found it helpful in 
the Virginia convention to mention the Framers’ intent briefly when a 
dispute arose over the manner of electing the President under Article 
II.197  He explained that each elector had two votes because “one vote 
was intended for the Vice-President.”198  Madison also addressed the 
purpose of the Census Clause,199 saying that it “was intended to introduce 
equality in the burdens to be laid on the community.”200 
Even when delegates to the state ratifying conventions who had 
participated in the federal convention did not make explicit representa-
tions about what the Framers at the federal convention had intended, 
their statements may reflect the original intent.  For example, when Wil-
son, Madison, and Hamilton spoke at the Pennsylvania, Virginia, and 
New York conventions, everyone knew that they previously had partici-
pated in the federal convention.  They were seen as Framers, and they 
spoke as Framers.  They did not need to preface their remarks by saying 
that they were representing the views of the federal convention because 
that was likely taken for granted. 
 
 193. See 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 435–36. 
 194. See id. 
 195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Sena-
tors and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Con-
gress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Sena-
tors.”). 
 196. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 440. 
 197. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (“The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote 
by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with 
themselves.”). 
 198. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 495. 
 199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after 
the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, 
in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.”). 
 200. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 458. 
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For this reason, when describing the Framers’ intent, some writers 
look not only to the notes from the federal convention, but also to what 
the Framers subsequently said at the state ratifying conventions.  For ex-
ample, in Nixon v. United States,201 Justice White wrote a concurrence in 
the judgment in which he addressed what “the Framers” intended with 
respect to impeachment proceedings.  In attempting to discern the Fra-
mers’ intent, Justice White looked at Hamilton’s positions during the 
federal convention and also later at the New York ratification conven-
tion.202 
Original Objective Meaning 
The records of the state ratifying conventions also may provide evi-
dence of the original objective meaning of the Constitution: the reasona-
ble meaning of the text of the Constitution at the time of the framing.  
The records may supply this information because they contain many ex-
amples showing how words and phrases—especially the legal and politi-
cal expressions contained in the Constitution—were used in 1787 and 
1788.  In other words, the records of the state conventions comprise a 
large corpus of speech from the era.  This corpus, when examined for lin-
guistic clues, may help us more than two centuries later to understand 
what the text of the Constitution objectively meant when it was written. 
For example, in INS v. St. Cyr, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a dis-
sent in which he interpreted the Constitution’s Suspension Clause.203  
This clause says, “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public 
Safety may require it.”204  Attempting to discern the original objective 
meaning, Justice Scalia reasoned, “A straightforward reading of this text 
discloses that it does not guarantee any content to (or even the existence 
of) the writ of habeas corpus, but merely provides that the writ shall not 
(except in case of rebellion or invasion) be suspended.”205  To support 
this conclusion, Justice Scalia cited dictionaries from the founding era 
and other sources as evidence showing how a reasonable person might 
have interpreted the language.206  In addition, Justice Scalia asserted, 
“Indeed, that [straightforward meaning] was precisely the objection ex-
 
 201. 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 202. Id. at 244 (White, J., concurring) (“While at the Convention, Hamilton advocated that im-
peachment trials be conducted by a court made up of state-court judges.  Four months after publishing 
the Federalist Nos. 65 and 66, however, he urged the New York Ratifying Convention to amend the 
Clause he had so ably defended to have the Senate, the Supreme Court, and judges from each State 
jointly try impeachments.” (citations omitted)). 
 203. 533 U.S. 289, 336–41 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 204. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 205. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 337. 
 206. Id. (citing dictionaries from 1789 and 1773). 
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pressed by four of the state ratifying conventions—that the Constitution 
failed affirmatively to guarantee a right to habeas corpus.”207 
In this passage, Justice Scalia was citing the records of the state rati-
fying conventions not because he thought that the ratifiers’ subjective be-
liefs should control the interpretation of the Constitution, but instead to 
buttress his contention that a reasonable person of the time would have 
interpreted the clause in the manner that he suggests. 
A similar illustration comes from Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent 
in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison.208  Justice 
Thomas looked at a variety of texts from the founding era to determine 
whether the words “duty,” “impost,” and “import” were used with refer-
ence to interstate trade in addition to trade with foreign countries.209  Af-
ter observing how newspapers, statute books, and other sources used the 
terms in connection with interstate commerce, he added, “These refer-
ences to duties on interstate imports and exports are bolstered by several 
more in the ratification debates.”210 
In this passage, Justice Thomas is not citing the records of the state 
ratifying conventions to prove the subjective intentions of the ratifiers, 
but instead to show more broadly the original objective meaning of the 
Constitution’s words. 
Ratification Debates and the Bill of Rights 
Objections to the original Constitution as expressed at the state rati-
fying conventions also may help to identify the purpose of the subse-
quent protections afforded by the Bill of Rights.  For example, in Craw-
ford v. Washington,211 a criminal defendant argued that introduction into 
evidence of a recorded statement that he made to the police violated his 
rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.212  For 
guidance on the meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme 
Court considered history.  The Court explained that the Sixth Amend-
ment was added in part because delegates to state ratification conven-
 
 207. Id. (citing Rex A. Collings, Jr., Habeas Corpus for Convicts—Constitutional Right or Legisla-
tive Grace?, 40 CAL. L. REV. 335, 342 & nn.38–41 (1952)). 
 208. 520 U.S. 564, 609 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 209. Id. at 624 (concluding “based on this common 18th-century usage of the words ‘import’ and 
‘export,’ and the lack of any textual indication that the Clause was intended to apply exclusively to 
foreign goods, it seems likely that those who drafted the Constitution sought, through the Import-
Export Clause, to prohibit States from levying duties and imposts on goods imported from, or ex-
ported to, other States as well as foreign nations, and that those who ratified the Constitution would 
have so understood the Clause”). 
 210. Id. at 628–31 (citing 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 57–58 (“As to commerce, it is 
well known that the different states now pursue different systems of duties in regard to each other.  By 
this, and for want of general laws of prohibition through the Union, we have not secured even our own 
domestic traffic that passes from state to state.” (emphasis omitted))). 
 211. 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004). 
 212. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”). 
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tions had complained about the omission of a right to confrontation.213  
The Court said, 
At the Massachusetts ratifying convention, Abraham Holmes ob-
jected to this omission [of a right to confrontation] precisely on the 
ground that it would lead to civil-law [as opposed to common law] 
practices: “The mode of trial is altogether indetermined; . . . wheth-
er [the defendant] is to be allowed to confront the witnesses, and 
have the advantage of cross-examination, we are not yet told. . . . 
[W]e shall find Congress possessed of powers enabling them to in-
stitute judicatories little less inauspicious than a certain tribunal in 
Spain, . . . the Inquisition.”214 
The Court used this evidence from the state ratification debates to in-
terpret the subsequently adopted Sixth Amendment.215 
VI. POSSIBLE GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHING CLAIMS ABOUT THE 
ORIGINAL MEANING BASED ON THE RECORDS OF THE STATE 
RATIFICATION CONVENTIONS 
Many writers making constitutional arguments rely on the state rati-
fication debates for evidence to support their positions.  When they find 
remarks by delegates that reinforce their claims, they quote the pertinent 
passages from Elliot’s Debates or other collections of the debates.  Often, 
their readers will find evidence from the state ratification debates helpful 
and persuasive.  As the foregoing part has shown, the records of the state 
conventions may help to prove the original understanding of the ratifiers, 
the original intent of the Framers, or the original objective meaning of 
the Constitution’s text. 
But anyone citing the records of the state ratifying conventions 
should recognize that these records often do not provide perfect proof of 
the original meaning of the Constitution.  On the contrary, various signif-
icant grounds may exist for impeaching claims about the original mean-
ing based on these records.  The following discussion considers eight 
possible arguments that skeptics might raise in challenging originalist 
claims. 
In listing these eight arguments, I do not mean to suggest that the 
records of state ratifying conventions cannot provide any useful evidence 
of the original meaning.  Indeed, all of the arguments listed below are 
themselves subject to some counterarguments.  It is a subject involving 
shades of gray rather than black-and-white answers—which is why law-
 
 213. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48. 
 214. Id. at 48–49 (quoting 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 110–11). 
 215. Id. at 50–56.  In a dissenting opinion in another case, Justice Scalia observed that the Seventh 
Amendment was a “response to one of the principal objections to the proposed Constitution raised by 
the Anti-Federalists during the ratification debates: its failure to ensure the right to trial by jury in civil 
actions in federal court.”  Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 450 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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yers, judges, and legal scholars continue to refer to the records when at-
tempting to interpret the Constitution.  I suggest only that anyone mak-
ing or evaluating claims about the original meaning take these possible 
grounds for impeaching the claims into account. 
1. The Records of the State Ratifying Conventions Are Incomplete 
One potential ground for impeaching claims about the original 
meaning of the Constitution based on the records of the state ratification 
conventions is that the records are simply incomplete.216  As explained in 
Part IV above, extensive records exist only for the Pennsylvania, Massa-
chusetts, Virginia, and New York conventions.  Although we have a few 
records from the conventions in Connecticut, Maryland, South Carolina, 
and New Hampshire, we have no records of debates for the conventions 
that ratified the Constitution in Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, North 
Carolina (i.e., the second North Carolina convention), and Rhode Island.  
As a result, just looking at the records cannot provide a complete picture 
of what the ratifiers said and thought. 
Two consequences flow from the incompleteness of the record.  
First, in general, drawing inferences from a silence in the records is high-
ly risky.  The ratifiers may have discussed a subject at length, but the 
records simply may not include their discussion.  As Justice Clarence 
Thomas said in his dissent in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, “The fact is 
that arguments based on the absence of recorded debate at the ratifica-
tion conventions are suspect, because the surviving records of those de-
bates are fragmentary.”217 
Second, even when records address a particular point, they may not 
provide a complete account.  For example, in the Massachusetts conven-
tion, a delegate named Widgery addressed the clause in the Constitution 
that requires Congress to publish a journal of its proceedings “excepting 
such Parts as may in their judgment require secrecy.”218  The Massachu-
setts records say, “Mr. WIDGERY read the paragraph, and said, by the 
words, ‘except such parts as may require secrecy,’ Congress might with-
hold the whole journals under this pretence, and thereby the people be 
kept in ignorance of their doings.”219  From this statement, we know how 
Mr. Widgery interpreted the clause, but we do not know what delegates 
in Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, North Carolina, or Rhode Island 
thought because we do not have records from those conventions. 
 
 216. Hutson, supra note 25, at 21–24 (describing incompleteness of the historical record). 
 217. 514 U.S. 779, 900 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 291, 370 (2002) (discussing whether “a 
meaningful interpretive clue [can] be drawn from silence—from the fact that no one spoke about the 
particular problem” at state ratifying conventions). 
 218. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
 219. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 52. 
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These observations, although important, should not wholly preclude 
reliance on the records of the state ratification debates.  The objection of 
incompleteness of the records mostly pertains to efforts to discern the 
original understanding of the ratifiers and the original intent of the Fra-
mers: we cannot determine these meanings with confidence unless we 
have a thorough record of what the ratifiers and Framers thought.  But 
the objection has less significance for the original objective meaning be-
cause the records’ text can provide evidence of the typical meaning of 
words and phrases at the time of ratification even if the records are in-
complete. 
Even more significantly, it is important to realize that history is 
never a precise science.  Gaps always will exist in historic records.  But 
that does not mean that we can never know anything about history.  Per-
haps the best advice on this point comes from the esteemed constitution-
al scholar, Henry Paul Monaghan.  Candidly recognizing that the records 
of state ratification debates are incomplete, he says, “We proceed as best 
we can.”220  Greater expectations simply are unrealistic. 
2. The Records of the State Ratifying Conventions Are Not Necessarily 
Verbatim Transcripts of the Debates 
The records of the state ratifying conventions purport to capture 
what individual speakers said at the ratification debates.  But these re-
ports are generally not verbatim accounts for two reasons.  First, the re-
porters lacked the technical capacity to produce verbatim transcripts.  
Audio recording devices did not exist in the eighteenth century.  Al-
though some reporters attempted to use early forms of shorthand, they 
could not take down all of the comments accurately.221  True, in some in-
stances, the compilers of the convention records may have had access to 
copies of prepared speeches.  But for the most part, the records at best 
consist of approximate reconstructions of what was said based on incom-
plete notes taken in longhand.  Indeed, despite what Madison said in the 
quotation at the start of this Article about the debates in the state con-
ventions being the best evidence of the original meaning, Madison also 
said that he “wished not to be understood as putting entire confidence in 
the accuracy of them.”222  He explained, “Even those of Virginia, which 
had probably been taken down by the most skilful hand, . . . contained 
internal evidence in abundance of chasms and misconceptions of what 
was said.”223 
 
 220. Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional 
Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 151 (1996). 
 221. See Hutson, supra note 25, at 20 (arguing that “the technique of shorthand was in its infancy 
in the United States and did not provide the means of recording public discourse accurately”). 
 222. 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 777 (1796) (remarks of James Madison), available at http://memory. 
loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=005/llac005.db&recNum=385. 
 223. Id. 
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Second, many of the reporters were too incompetent or too politi-
cally biased to make accurate reports of the debates.  For example, ac-
cording to one scholar, the official reporter for the Pennsylvania and 
Maryland ratifying conventions was regularly inebriated.224  James Hut-
son identifies numerous and almost equally shocking facts about the in-
competence and political biases of reporters in New Hampshire, Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, and New York.225 
Because the records are not verbatim, they may not provide precise 
evidence of what the ratifiers or Framers understood the Constitution to 
mean.  For example, Governor Edmund Randolph is reported to have 
said at the Virginia ratifying convention that “no power is given express-
ly to Congress over religion.”226  Some scholars have focused on the word 
“expressly” in this quotation.227  They have inferred from it that Ran-
dolph may have believed that Congress might possess implied power to 
regulate the subject of religion.228  This inference is certainly plausible if 
the records of the convention accurately report what Randolph said.  But 
we do not know for certain that Randolph actually used the word “ex-
pressly.”  Whoever took the notes might simply have added that word.  
Scholars quoting the records thus must exercise great caution before 
drawing conclusions.229 
This potential ground for impeaching claims made about the origi-
nal meaning of the Constitution, however, should not be carried too far.  
Although the records of the state ratifying conventions may not be ver-
batim and may be inaccurate and politically biased, they still may have 
some value in determining the original meaning of the Constitution.  
They might provide general evidence of what the ratifiers thought with-
out being exact quotations.  For example, as noted above, at the Virginia 
convention, a question arose about whether the grant to federal courts of 
jurisdiction over cases “between a State and Citizens of another State” 
means that a citizen could sue a state in federal court despite the usual 
rule of sovereign immunity.  The records contain quotations by both 
Madison and Marshall saying that the clause does not have this mean-
 
 224. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1802 n.405 (1996) 
(“Thomas Lloyd, who served as the official reporter for the Pennsylvania and Maryland ratifying con-
ventions, was often too drunk to take anything down, much less take anything down accurately.”). 
 225. See Hutson, supra note 25, at 21–24. 
 226. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 204. 
 227. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 73, 91 (2005) (“At the Virginia ratifying convention, Governor Edmund Randolph 
let the feline slip from the sack: in stating that ‘no power is given expressly to Congress over religion,’ 
he implicitly admitted that Congress would enjoy implied powers on the subject.” (footnote omitted)). 
 228. Id. at 91–92. 
 229. See John C. Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967, 988 n.89 (1993) 
(arguing that “speeches and letters made during the constitutional ratifying conventions . . . should be 
used carefully in interpretation due to their unreliability and our ignorance of the speaker’s motives”). 
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ing.230  We might not know exactly what words these two ratifiers used, 
but might still infer from their remarks what their general position was. 
In addition, if researchers are looking for evidence of the original 
objective meaning of the Constitution, then the paraphrasing of speak-
ers’ remarks probably does not matter very much.  The language of the 
records may serve as evidence of eighteenth century linguistic usage 
whether the words and phrases in the records came from the delegates 
themselves or from the persons who took notes on what they said.  Thus, 
although the records may not be verbatim, they are not useless simply for 
that reason. 
3. The Views of Individual Delegates May Not Represent the Views of 
the Ratifiers Generally 
Claims about the original meaning of the Constitution sometimes 
rely on statements made by individual ratifiers.  In many instances, these 
claims might be impeached on grounds that the views of individual dele-
gates may not represent the understanding of the ratifiers generally.  Or 
as one scholar pointedly has asked, “There were over 1,600 men who at-
tended the State ratifying conventions—whose intent is to prevail?”231 
For example, in Clinton v. Jones,232 the Supreme Court had to de-
cide whether the federal courts could exercise jurisdiction in a civil case 
against the President.  The Court relied on James Wilson’s statement at 
the Pennsylvania convention that “far from being above the laws, [the 
President] is amenable to them in his private character as a citizen.”233 
This quotation makes clear that James Wilson understood the Constitu-
tion to have this meaning.  But we do not know whether the other dele-
gates at the Pennsylvania convention shared his views.  The Pennsylvania 
convention never took a vote on the specific issue.234  Even more signifi-
cantly, we do not know whether any of the delegates at the other state 
ratifying conventions even thought about the issue.  In all of the records 
of the state ratifying debates, no one else appears to have addressed it. 
The question thus arises whether it is possible to infer, in the ab-
sence of contrary evidence, that other ratifiers agreed with Wilson’s posi-
tion on this issue of presidential immunity.  This question has no simple 
 
 230. See 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 533 (quoting Madison as saying, “It is not in the 
power of individuals to call any state into court.”); id. at 555 (quoting Marshall as saying, “I hope that 
no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal court.”). 
 231. Stephen A. James, Original Intent: The Judicial Uses of History and Constitutional Interpreta-
tion in Australia and the United States, 12 IN PUB. INTEREST 23, 28 (1992). 
 232. 520 U.S. 681, 684 (1997). 
 233. Id. at 696 (quoting 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 480). 
 234. A few conventions did express views on specific issues.  For example, the Rhode Island Con-
vention’s formal ratification document includes this statement: “It is declared by the Convention, that 
the judicial power of the United States, in cases in which a state may be a party, does not extend to 
criminal prosecutions, or to authorize any suit by any person against a state . . . .”  1 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 23, at 336. 
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answer.  On one hand, we know that the Constitution ultimately was rati-
fied, and something must have influenced the delegates to vote for ratifi-
cation.  It does not stretch the imagination to suppose that the arguments 
of supporters of the Constitution were persuasive in most instances.235  
This reasoning tends to support the inference that other delegates agreed 
with Wilson.  Although the Supreme Court did not explain its thinking, it 
may have had this rationale in mind when it relied on Wilson’s statement 
in Clinton v. Jones. 
On the other hand, much of what the supporters of the Constitution 
at the ratification debates said seems unpersuasive and implausible.  For 
example, as described in Part IV above, James Wilson suggested at the 
Pennsylvania convention that enumerating rights in the Constitution 
would be dangerous because it would suggest that the federal govern-
ment has implied powers.236  Most of the delegates probably did not 
agree with this position.  Indeed, several states recommended adding a 
bill of rights to the Constitution, and the first Congress immediately pro-
posed amendments for this purpose.  Thus, writers should take caution in 
making generalizations about what the ratifiers collectively understood 
based on comments of individual delegates. 
4. Each of the Ratifying Conventions May Have Had a Different 
Understanding of the Constitution 
A closely related ground for impeaching claims about the original 
meaning based on the records of the state ratifying conventions is that 
the various state conventions may have had different understandings of 
the Constitution at the time of ratification.  Each state convention acted 
separately in ratifying the Constitution.  They did not all meet and vote 
at the same time.  For this reason, the delegates in one state did not nec-
essarily know what the delegates at conventions in other states 
thought.237  The Delaware convention, for example, could not know what 
the other state conventions believed because the Delaware convention 
acted first.  And the other state conventions could not know what the 
Delaware delegates thought because of the absence of any records from 
Delaware.  In addition, four of the original thirteen states—Virginia, 
New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island—ratified the Constitution 
after it already had gone into effect among the other nine states.238  It is 
 
 235. However, as Part VI.5 below demonstrates, in some instances we can surmise that factors 
other than the arguments of the supporters of the Constitution persuaded delegates to vote for ratifi-
cation. 
 236. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 436–37. 
 237. George Anastaplo, The Constitution at Two Hundred: Explorations, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
967, 1037–38 (1991) (observing that some state conventions ratified without knowing what had been 
said at other conventions). 
 238. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 217, at 370 (arguing that evidence from the New York 
and North Carolina ratifying conventions is less probative because “[t]hese ratifying conventions met 
after the requisite nine States had adopted the Constitution”). 
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difficult to see how the debates in these four states could have shaped (or 
rather reshaped) the Constitution’s meaning.  Indeed, taking a very strict 
view, some scholars have argued that “it is not the understanding of one, 
two, or even three ratifying conventions that should constitute sufficient 
evidence of constitutional meaning, but the understanding of nine state 
ratifying conventions, or perhaps, all thirteen state ratifying conven-
tions.”239 
The observation that the conventions in different states may have 
attached different meanings to the Constitution at a minimum suggests 
caution in attempting to discern the original understanding of the Consti-
tution based on comments from a single state convention.  A corollary, 
though, would seem to be that evidence from multiple state conventions 
generally makes arguments about the original understanding stronger.  
For example, in arguing that the ratifiers did not understand the Consti-
tution to impose term limits on members of Congress, the Supreme 
Court, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, stressed that “at least three 
States proposed some form of constitutional amendment supporting term 
limits,” suggesting that they believed term limits were not otherwise 
possible.240  Evidence from three states simply carries more weight than 
evidence from only one or two states. 
The possibility that state conventions may not have had the same 
understanding of the Constitution does not necessarily affect claims 
about the original intent of the Framers or the original objective meaning 
of the Constitution.  Statements at state conventions by delegates who 
formerly had served at the federal convention may accurately reflect the 
intent of the Framers, regardless of whether other delegates adopted the 
same understanding of the Constitution.  And in determining the original 
objective meaning of the Constitution, the subjective beliefs of delegates 
at particular conventions is not tremendously relevant.  More important 
is the manner in which speakers in 1787 and 1788 used the words and 
phrases in the Constitution. 
5. Statements Made During the Ratification Debates in the State 
Conventions, in Many Instances, Were Not What Actually Persuaded the 
Ratifiers to Support the Constitution 
A fifth possible ground for impeaching claims about the original 
meaning based on the records of the state ratifying conventions is that 
statements made during the ratification debates were not necessarily 
what persuaded delegates to support the Constitution.  In some of the 
state conventions, the debates resembled staged theater more than actual 
deliberation.  In Maryland and South Carolina, for example, more Fede-
 
 239. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret 
Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1162 (2003). 
 240. 514 U.S. 779, 826 n.40 (1995). 
MAGGS.DOC 2/23/2009  4:03 PM 
No. 2] RECORDS OF STATE RATIFYING CONVENTIONS 493 
ralists were elected to serve as delegates than Anti-Federalists.241  The 
delegates may have debated various points, but it was almost surely the 
delegate elections that determined the outcome of the ratification 
process.  In Massachusetts, the result might have differed if more Anti-
Federalists had shown up for the final vote.  In other states, arguments 
about the Constitution’s meaning probably gave way to practicality.  
New York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island—the last three states to 
ratify—clearly felt pressure to join the Union because they did not want 
to be left out after all of the other states had ratified the Constitution.  
As Alexander Hamilton said in the quotation mentioned in Part IV 
above, “circumstances,” rather than persuasive arguments, convinced the 
New York convention to support the Constitution.242 
These observations suggest that readers should not assume, in all in-
stances, that statements at the state ratifying conventions affected the 
delegates’ understanding of the Constitution.  But two points deserve 
mention.  First, in some states, arguments at the state conventions prob-
ably did make a difference.  In Virginia, for example, the outcome was 
uncertain and the final vote was very close.  Observers at the time, in-
cluding John Marshall, certainly thought that Madison’s remarks helped 
to win passage of the Constitution.243  Second, even if the delegates al-
ready had made up their minds before they arrived at the state conven-
tions, the arguments they made during debates probably reflected rea-
soning that they previously had found persuasive.  The records thus may 
serve as an accurate repository of the delegates’ thoughts on the Consti-
tution even if the debates did not change many minds at the conventions. 
6. The Records Provide Unreliable and Otherwise Suspect Evidence 
of the Intent of the Framers (as Opposed to the Ratifiers) of the 
Constitution 
The records of the state ratification debates in theory may provide 
evidence of the original intent of the Framers at the federal convention.  
For example, as shown above, James Wilson and James Madison some-
times made explicit representations about what the Framers intended 
when they included particular clauses in the Constitution.244  But this evi-
dence of the original intent of the Framers is somewhat suspect.  Dele-
gates to the federal convention had agreed not to discuss the proceed-
ings.245  For this reason, Wilson and Madison should not have revealed 
the internal thoughts of the federal convention.  Even more to the point, 
 
 241. Nadelhaft, supra note 116, at 173; Stiverson, supra note 106, at 146. 
 242. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra Part V. 
 245. Madison’s notes for May 29 report the rule: “That nothing spoken in the House be printed, 
or otherwise published, or communicated without leave.”  1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 13, at 15. 
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though, statements by former delegates to the federal convention are not 
necessarily reliable because few other delegates realistically could con-
tradict their assertions.  Most delegates to the state conventions had not 
attended the federal convention and did not know what had transpired 
there, and those who had been to the federal convention generally took 
the requirement of secrecy more seriously. 
Perhaps most untrustworthy are representations about the Framers’ 
intent by delegates to state conventions who had not participated at the 
federal convention.  For example, in the Virginia convention, William 
Grayson explained the Framers’ intent in including Article IV, Section 3, 
Clause 2, which gives Congress the power to dispose of territorial proper-
ty.246  Grayson said, 
This clause was inserted for the purpose of enabling Congress to 
dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting, 
the territory, or other property, belonging to the United States, and 
to ascertain clearly that the claims of particular states, respecting 
territory, should not be prejudiced by the alteration of the govern-
ment, but be on the same footing as before; that it could not be con-
strued to be a limitation on the power of making treaties.247 
In this statement, Grayson appears to be representing why the Framers 
included this clause.  But Grayson was not a delegate to the federal con-
vention and thus had no obvious basis for making his statement.  Perhaps 
his beliefs were pure speculation.  Anyone citing the records of the state 
ratifying conventions for evidence of the original intent of the Framers 
should take these considerations into account. 
7. Statements from the State Ratification Debates Are Often Taken out 
of Context 
A seventh possible ground for impeaching claims about the original 
meaning based on records of the state ratifying conventions is that the 
cited statements have been taken out of context.  This potential problem 
has three causes.  First, our concerns about issues today are not necessar-
ily the same as those of delegates to the state ratifying conventions more 
than two hundred years ago.  Second, the records of the state ratification 
debates are so sparse that they often contain little that is directly relevant 
to a disputed issue.  Third, lawyers (and some judges) often must grasp 
for anything that might possibly be helpful because they need to resolve 
issues that do not necessarily have clear answers. 
 
 246. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful 
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and 
nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of 
any particular State.”). 
 247. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 505. 
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Consider this example.  In Wesberry v. Sanders,248 the Supreme 
Court held that unevenly apportioned congressional districts violated a 
constitutional requirement that representatives be chosen by the people.  
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on a statement by Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney at the South Carolina convention.249  Pinckey said 
that representatives in the House would “be so chosen as to represent in 
due proportion the people of the Union.”250  But the dissent contended 
that the Court had taken this comment out of context.  The dissent said, 
“[Pinckney] had in mind only that other clear provision of the Constitu-
tion that representation would be apportioned among the States accord-
ing to population.  None of his remarks bears on apportionment within 
the States.”251  I do not take sides on this particular issue, but merely 
present the disagreement as an example of how claims based on the 
records of the state ratifying conventions might be impeached on 
grounds that they are not what they initially appear to be.  Anyone mak-
ing or evaluating such claims should take the full meaning and context of 
any cited statements into account. 
8. The Ratification Debates by Themselves Cannot Provide Much 
Guidance for Interpreting the Bill of Rights 
As explained above, the Supreme Court sometimes looks at the 
records of the state ratifying conventions for evidence of the original 
meaning of the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the Constitu-
tion.  This practice rests on the theory that Congress acted to add the Bill 
of Rights in response to criticisms raised at the state ratifying conven-
tions.  But this theory has limits.  In a concurring opinion in Cutter v. 
Wilkinson,252 Justice Thomas concluded that a statement by James Madi-
son at the Virginia convention and a statement by James Iredell at the 
North Carolina convention could not prove the original meaning of the 
Establishment Clause in the First Amendment.253  Though the statements 
might reflect the original meaning of the Constitution before its amend-
ment, the litigants had not “shown that the Establishment Clause codi-
fied Madison’s or Iredell’s view.”254  To put this reasoning in more gener-
al terms, records from the state conventions by themselves cannot show 
the meaning of the Bill of Rights.  Although the records may reveal a de-
sire by the delegates for amendment, other evidence must show that 
Congress and the states specifically adopted the views of the state ratify-
 
 248. 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964). 
 249. See id. at 16. 
 250. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 257. 
 251. 376 U.S. at 34 n.19 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
 252. 544 U.S. 709, 730 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 253. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion . . . .”). 
 254. 544 U.S. at 730. 
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ing conventions when they amended the Constitution to include the Bill 
of Rights. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Thousands of articles and hundreds of cases have cited the records 
of the state ratifying conventions to support claims about the original 
meaning of the Constitution.  Anyone reading these sources needs to 
know what records exist, why they might provide evidence of the original 
meaning of the Constitution, and what weaknesses claims about the orig-
inal meaning which rest on them might have.  I have attempted here to 
offer a concise guide to these records.  In addition to explaining theories 
of how the records might help to prove the original intent of the Framers, 
the original understanding of the ratifiers, and the original objective 
meaning of the Constitution’s text, I have also included a list of eight im-
portant possible grounds for impeaching assertions made about the orig-
inal meaning.  The grounds all have some merit, but they do not totally 
negate the value of the records of the state conventions.  Authors should 
continue to cite these documents, but they should proceed with care, 
knowing the strengths and weaknesses in their arguments. 
 
